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AGENTS.md
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# Beacon CM4 — Quick Reference # Beacon CM4 — Agent Quick Reference
> Full docs: `beacon-buildroot/README.md` > Full docs: `beacon-buildroot/README.md`
## Device
- **Login**: `user` / `beacon` (sudo passwordless; root login disabled)
- **MAC**: `d8:3a:dd:a8:9a:40` — IP is DHCP, changes on reboot
- **Find IP**: `CM4=$(ip neigh show dev enp0s31f6 | awk '/d8:3a:dd:a8:9a:40/{print $1; exit}')`
- **SSH**: `sshpass -p beacon ssh user@$CM4` — use `-tt` for `rauc` commands
- **File transfer**: `scp` broken on Dropbear → use `ssh 'sudo tee /upload/file >/dev/null' < localfile`
- **UART**: `picocom -b 115200 /dev/ttyUSB0` — user handles power cycling manually
## Build ## Build
```bash ```bash
cd ~/repos/buildroot-beacon cd ~/repos/buildroot-beacon
make -C rpi-buildroot-fork O=$(pwd)/output BR2_EXTERNAL=$(pwd)/beacon-buildroot -j$(nproc) make -C rpi-buildroot-fork O=$(pwd)/output BR2_EXTERNAL=$(pwd)/beacon-buildroot -j$(nproc)
# outputs: output/images/rootfs.raucb update.raucb sdcard.img.xz
``` ```
## Flash (initial, EMMC_DISABLE jumper bridged) ## Flash (secure-boot CM4)
Bridge EMMC_DISABLE jumper + connect USB, then:
```bash ```bash
./beacon-buildroot/scripts/flash-cm4.sh # auto-detect bash beacon-buildroot/scripts/flash-cm4-sb.sh # auto-detect
./beacon-buildroot/scripts/flash-cm4.sh /dev/sda # explicit device bash beacon-buildroot/scripts/flash-cm4-sb.sh /dev/sda # explicit
```
## SSH / find IP
```bash
# Non-secure-boot CM4 (MAC e4:5f:01:e9:13:96):
CM4=$(ip neigh show dev enp0s31f6 | awk '/e4:5f:01:e9:13:96/{print $1}')
# Secure-boot CM4 (MAC 2c:cf:67:fd:93:1a):
CM4=$(ip neigh show dev enp0s31f6 | awk '/2c:cf:67:fd:93:1a/{print $1}')
sshpass -p beacon ssh user@$CM4 # login: user / beacon
``` ```
Script auto-signs `usbboot/secure-boot-msd/boot.img` with `private.pem` if needed.
## OTA Update ## OTA Update
```bash ```bash
# transfer (scp broken on Dropbear — use tee pipe): # Transfer bundle
sshpass -p beacon ssh user@$CM4 'sudo tee /upload/rootfs.raucb >/dev/null' \ sshpass -p beacon ssh user@$CM4 'sudo tee /upload/rootfs.raucb >/dev/null' \
< output/images/rootfs.raucb < output/images/rootfs.raucb
# install + reboot: # Install + reboot
sshpass -p beacon ssh -tt user@$CM4 'rauc install /upload/rootfs.raucb && sudo reboot' sshpass -p beacon ssh -tt user@$CM4 'sudo rauc install /upload/rootfs.raucb && sudo reboot'
# after reboot find new IP, then mark-good (REQUIRED on every new boot to confirm slot): # After reboot: find new IP, then MUST mark-good or slot rolls back
sshpass -p beacon ssh -tt user@$CM4 'rauc status mark-good && rauc status' sshpass -p beacon ssh -tt user@$CM4 'sudo rauc status mark-good && rauc status'
# NOTE: rauc commands need -tt (PTY) on Dropbear SSH or output is silently dropped
# NOTE: mark-good MUST be called after each OTA reboot — without it RAUC falls back to previous slot
``` ```
## UART ## Key gotchas
```bash - `lsblk` not on target — use `cryptsetup status data` to check `/data`
picocom -b 115200 /dev/ttyUSB1 # interactive (GPIO14/15) - `rauc` needs `-tt` on Dropbear or output is silently dropped
socat -u /dev/ttyUSB1,b115200,rawer,crnl OPEN:/tmp/uart.log,creat,trunc & # headless capture - `mark-good` is required after every OTA reboot
``` - `/data` is LUKS2 (AES-XTS-256, OTP key) — untouched by RAUC, self-heals on bad header
- `private.pem` at repo root — **never regenerate** it
## Rescue
Short GPIO4 (pin 7) → GND (pin 9) during power-on → boots `/dev/mmcblk0p2`.
## Secure Boot — Unlock as MSD
```bash
# Sign the MSD boot image with private.pem (once, or after rpi-eeprom submodule init):
cd usbboot/secure-boot-msd
../tools/rpi-eeprom-digest -i boot.img -o boot.sig -k ../../private.pem
# Expose eMMC as USB mass storage (user must bridge EMMC_DISABLE jumper first):
sudo ./usbboot/rpiboot -d usbboot/secure-boot-msd
# Flash:
sudo bmaptool copy output/images/sdcard.img.xz /dev/sda
```
## UART / Power Cycle
> **The user handles power cycling and UART logging manually.**
> Ask user to: remove EMMC_DISABLE jumper → power-cycle → connect picocom.
```bash
picocom -b 115200 /dev/ttyUSB1 # user runs this to see boot log
```
Expected secure boot log lines: `secure-boot`, `rsa-verify pass (0x0)`, then U-Boot.
## Secure Boot — Provision (burn OTP)
```bash
update-pieeprom.sh -k private.pem && rpiboot -d secure-boot-recovery
```
> Use existing `private.pem` — never regenerate it.
## Disk Encryption (/data partition) ✅ COMPLETE
`/dev/mmcblk0p3` is LUKS2-encrypted using the device-unique 256-bit OTP private key.
Key is read from OTP at every boot via `/dev/vcio` (VideoCore mailbox).
No key ever touches disk — tmpfs only.
**Self-healing:** If service finds a LUKS header that can't be opened (e.g. stale header
surviving a sparse bmaptool flash), it wipes the first 4 MB and re-formats automatically.
**Note:** `lsblk` is not installed on target — use `cryptsetup status` instead.
```bash
# Check /data is mounted + encrypted:
sshpass -p beacon ssh user@$CM4 'sudo cryptsetup status data'
# Expected: type: LUKS2, cipher: aes-xts-plain64, keysize: 512 bits, mode: read/write
# Read OTP key (hex, stable across reboots) — requires root:
sshpass -p beacon ssh user@$CM4 'sudo beacon-otp-key'
# Verify LUKS2 header + keyslots:
sshpass -p beacon ssh user@$CM4 'sudo cryptsetup luksDump /dev/mmcblk0p3'
```
**OTA update behavior:** RAUC only writes to rootfs.0/1 — data partition is untouched.
On reboot into new slot, service opens LUKS with same OTP key → same data accessible.
Verified: A→B and B→A OTA both maintain encrypted /data correctly.
**Security model:** OTP key is protected by secure boot (only signed boot.img runs).
Root processes within the signed OS can still read OTP via `/dev/vcio` (RPi hardware limitation).

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README.md
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# Beacon CM4 — Buildroot + RAUC # Beacon CM4 — Buildroot + RAUC
Buildroot BR2_EXTERNAL for a Raspberry Pi CM4 with A/B OTA updates via [RAUC](https://rauc.io/). Buildroot BR2_EXTERNAL for Raspberry Pi CM4 with:
- **RAUC A/B OTA updates** (rootfs.0 / rootfs.1)
- **Secure boot** (RPi EEPROM OTP, signed `boot.img`)
- **Disk encryption** (`/data` on LUKS2, key derived from device OTP)
## Partition layout ## Partition layout
| # | Label | Size | Content | | Dev | Size | Mount | Content |
|---|-------|------|---------| |-----|------|-------|---------|
| p1 | boot_a | 64 MiB | FAT32 — firmware + U-Boot (slot A) | | p1 | 256 MiB | — | FAT32 outer boot (firmware, boot.img, boot.sig, boot.scr) |
| p2 | boot_b | 64 MiB | FAT32 — firmware + U-Boot (slot B) | | p2 | 64 MiB | — | Rescue rootfs (ext4) |
| p3 | data | 256 MiB | ext4 — persistent data (`/data`) | | p3 | 128 MiB | `/data` | LUKS2 encrypted persistent data |
| p4 | (extended) | — | — | | p5 | 900 MiB | `/` | Rootfs slot A (ext4) |
| p5 | rootfs0 | 250 MiB | ext4 — rootfs slot A | | p6 | 900 MiB | — | Rootfs slot B (ext4) |
| p6 | rootfs1 | 250 MiB | ext4 — rootfs slot B | | p7 | 900 MiB | `/upload` | OTA bundle staging (ext4) |
| p7 | upload | 256 MiB | ext4 — staging area for bundles (`/upload`) |
U-Boot reads `BOOT_ORDER`/`BOOT_x_LEFT` env vars from eMMC and selects the active slot before loading the kernel. RAUC uses `boot-mbr-switch` to toggle between slots.
--- ---
@@ -22,241 +22,119 @@ U-Boot reads `BOOT_ORDER`/`BOOT_x_LEFT` env vars from eMMC and selects the activ
### 1. Generate RAUC signing certificates ### 1. Generate RAUC signing certificates
Run **once** from the `beacon-buildroot/` directory:
```bash ```bash
cd ~/repos/buildroot-beacon/beacon-buildroot cd beacon-buildroot
./openssl-ca.sh "Beacon" "Beacon RAUC CA" ./openssl-ca.sh "Beacon" "Beacon RAUC CA"
``` ```
This creates `openssl-ca/dev/` with: Creates `openssl-ca/dev/`: `ca.cert.pem` (installed on device as keyring), `development-1.cert.pem` + `private/development-1.key.pem` (signing, host-only).
``` > **Never regenerate** the CA after devices are flashed — new CA = rejected bundles.
openssl-ca/dev/
ca.cert.pem ← keyring installed into target /etc/rauc/keyring.pem
development-1.cert.pem ← signing cert (build host)
private/
development-1.key.pem ← signing key (build host, keep secret)
```
> **Do not regenerate** the CA once devices are flashed — bundles signed with ### 2. Build
> a new CA will be rejected by devices that have the old keyring.
### 2. Initial full build
```bash ```bash
cd ~/repos/buildroot-beacon cd ~/repos/buildroot-beacon
make -C rpi-buildroot-fork \ # First time: load defconfig
O=$(pwd)/output \ make -C rpi-buildroot-fork O=$(pwd)/output BR2_EXTERNAL=$(pwd)/beacon-buildroot beacon_cm4_rauc_defconfig
BR2_EXTERNAL=$(pwd)/beacon-buildroot \
beacon_cm4_rauc_defconfig
make -C rpi-buildroot-fork \ # Build (incremental on subsequent runs)
O=$(pwd)/output \ make -C rpi-buildroot-fork O=$(pwd)/output BR2_EXTERNAL=$(pwd)/beacon-buildroot -j$(nproc)
BR2_EXTERNAL=$(pwd)/beacon-buildroot \
-j$(nproc)
``` ```
Output artifacts in `output/images/`: Outputs in `output/images/`:
- `sdcard.img.xz` + `.bmap` — full eMMC image for initial flash
| File | Purpose | - `rootfs.raucb` — OTA bundle (rootfs only)
|------|---------| - `update.raucb` — OTA bundle (bootfs + rootfs)
| `sdcard.img.xz` | Full eMMC image for initial flash |
| `sdcard.img.bmap` | Block map for fast flash with bmaptool |
| `rootfs.raucb` | **OTA bundle** — rootfs only |
| `update.raucb` | OTA bundle — bootfs + rootfs (full system) |
### 3. Initial flash (EMMC_DISABLE jumper bridged)
```bash
./beacon-buildroot/scripts/flash-cm4.sh
```
Remove the jumper and power-cycle after the script completes.
--- ---
## Creating an OTA update ## Initial flash
### What triggers a new bundle The CM4 uses **secure boot** — the eMMC can only be exposed as MSD using a `boot.img` signed with `private.pem`.
Any source change that results in a different `rootfs.ext4` or `boot.vfat` will produce a new bundle on the next build. Typical triggers:
- Package version bump / new package in defconfig
- File added/changed under `rootfs-overlay/`
- `post-build.sh` changes
- Kernel or U-Boot update
### Build the update
Incremental build — only changed packages and the rootfs/image stage are rebuilt:
1. Bridge the **EMMC_DISABLE** jumper and connect USB
2. Run:
```bash ```bash
cd ~/repos/buildroot-beacon bash beacon-buildroot/scripts/flash-cm4-sb.sh # auto-detect
bash beacon-buildroot/scripts/flash-cm4-sb.sh /dev/sda # explicit
# Optional: set a human-readable version string
export VERSION="1.2.0"
make -C rpi-buildroot-fork \
O=$(pwd)/output \
BR2_EXTERNAL=$(pwd)/beacon-buildroot \
-j$(nproc)
``` ```
The script auto-signs `usbboot/secure-boot-msd/boot.img` if needed, exposes eMMC via `rpiboot`, then flashes with `bmaptool`.
`post-image.sh` runs automatically at the end and: 3. Remove jumper → power-cycle
1. Builds `boot.vfat` from U-Boot + firmware blobs
2. Creates `rootfs.raucb` (rootfs-only bundle)
3. Creates `update.raucb` (full bootfs+rootfs bundle)
4. Signs both bundles with `development-1.key.pem`
5. Assembles `sdcard.img.xz` + `.bmap`
### Bundle contents ---
`rootfs.raucb` manifest (`format=verity`): ## OTA update
```ini
[update]
compatible=beacon-cm4
version=<VERSION>
[bundle]
format=verity
[image.rootfs]
filename=rootfs.ext4
```
`update.raucb` additionally contains `[image.bootloader]``boot.vfat`. ### Build the bundle
### Signing details Any change to packages, `rootfs-overlay/`, `post-build.sh`, or kernel triggers a new bundle on the next incremental build (same build command as above).
Signing is done by the host `rauc` binary during `post-image.sh`:
To inspect a bundle:
```bash ```bash
rauc bundle \ output/host/bin/rauc --keyring beacon-buildroot/openssl-ca/dev/ca.cert.pem \
--cert openssl-ca/dev/development-1.cert.pem \
--key openssl-ca/dev/private/development-1.key.pem \
--keyring openssl-ca/dev/ca.cert.pem \
<bundle-dir>/ <output>.raucb
```
The target verifies the bundle signature against `/etc/rauc/keyring.pem`
(= `ca.cert.pem` installed during build by `post-build.sh`).
To inspect a bundle without installing it:
```bash
output/host/bin/rauc \
--keyring beacon-buildroot/openssl-ca/dev/ca.cert.pem \
info output/images/rootfs.raucb info output/images/rootfs.raucb
``` ```
--- ### Find the CM4
## Deploying the update to the CM4
### Find the CM4's IP
The CM4 gets a DHCP address on eth0 (changes on each reboot):
```bash ```bash
# By MAC address: # Secure-boot CM4 (MAC d8:3a:dd:a8:9a:40):
ip neigh show dev enp0s31f6 | grep e4:5f:01:e9:13:96 CM4=$(ip neigh show dev enp0s31f6 | awk '/d8:3a:dd:a8:9a:40/{print $1; exit}')
``` ```
### Transfer the bundle ### Transfer, install, reboot
Dropbear has no sftp-server — standard `scp` does **not** work. `scp` does **not** work on Dropbear — use stdin pipe. `rauc` needs `-tt`.
Use stdin pipe instead:
```bash ```bash
CM4=10.11.0.xx # replace with actual IP # 1. Transfer
sshpass -p beacon ssh user@$CM4 'sudo tee /upload/rootfs.raucb >/dev/null' \
sshpass -p beacon ssh user@$CM4 \
'sudo tee /upload/rootfs.raucb > /dev/null' \
< output/images/rootfs.raucb < output/images/rootfs.raucb
# 2. Install + reboot
sshpass -p beacon ssh -tt user@$CM4 'sudo rauc install /upload/rootfs.raucb && sudo reboot'
``` ```
~51 MiB transfers in ~5 s on LAN. ### Mark-good after reboot (required)
### Install After reboot the new slot is in **trial mode** — it will roll back after 3 boots without `mark-good`.
```bash ```bash
sshpass -p beacon ssh user@$CM4 'rauc install /upload/rootfs.raucb' # Find new IP (DHCP changes on reboot):
``` CM4=$(ip neigh show dev enp0s31f6 | awk '/d8:3a:dd:a8:9a:40/{print $1; exit}')
Expected output: sshpass -p beacon ssh -tt user@$CM4 'sudo rauc status mark-good && rauc status'
```
0% Installing
20% Checking bundle done.
40% Determining target install group done.
46% Checking slot rootfs.1 done.
99% Copying image to rootfs.1 done.
100% Installing done.
Installing `/upload/rootfs.raucb` succeeded
```
RAUC automatically selects the **inactive** slot as the target.
### Reboot into the new slot
```bash
sshpass -p beacon ssh user@$CM4 'rauc status && sudo reboot'
```
`rauc status` should show `Activated: rootfs.1 (B)` before the reboot.
### Confirm and mark-good
After reboot the system boots into the new slot in **trial mode**
(U-Boot decrements `BOOT_x_LEFT`). You must mark it good or it will
roll back on the next reboot.
```bash
# Find new IP (DHCP address changes):
CM4_NEW=$(ip neigh show dev enp0s31f6 | awk '/e4:5f:01:e9:13:96/{print $1}')
sshpass -p beacon ssh user@$CM4_NEW 'rauc status mark-good && rauc status'
```
Expected final `rauc status`:
```
Booted from: rootfs.1 (B)
Activated: rootfs.1 (B)
x [rootfs.1] boot status: good ← currently running, committed
o [rootfs.0] boot status: good ← fallback
``` ```
--- ---
## Rollback behaviour ## Disk encryption
If `mark-good` is **not** called after a reboot, U-Boot decrements `/data` (`/dev/mmcblk0p3`) is LUKS2-encrypted at rest. The key is derived from the device-unique OTP private key via `/dev/vcio` (VideoCore mailbox) — never stored on disk.
`BOOT_x_LEFT`. After 3 failed attempts it switches back to the previous
slot automatically — no manual intervention needed.
To force an immediate rollback: - **First boot / stale header**: the service automatically wipes and reformats the partition.
- **OTA updates**: RAUC only writes to rootfs slots — `/data` is untouched and re-opens with the same OTP key.
Verify encryption on device:
```bash ```bash
# On the CM4: sshpass -p beacon ssh user@$CM4 'sudo cryptsetup status data'
sudo fw_setenv BOOT_ORDER "A B" # or "B A" depending on current slot # type: LUKS2, cipher: aes-xts-plain64, keysize: 512 bits
sudo reboot
``` ```
--- ---
## Rescue partition
Short **GPIO4** (pin 7) to **GND** (pin 9) on the 40-pin header during
power-on. U-Boot detects this and boots the read-only rescue rootfs from
`/dev/mmcblk0p2`.
---
## Reference ## Reference
| Path | Purpose | | Path | Purpose |
|------|---------| |------|---------|
| `configs/beacon_cm4_rauc_defconfig` | Buildroot defconfig | | `configs/beacon_cm4_rauc_defconfig` | Buildroot defconfig |
| `board/beacon-cm4/genimage.cfg` | Partition layout | | `board/beacon-cm4/genimage.cfg` | Partition layout |
| `board/beacon-cm4/post-image.sh` | Bundle creation + signing | | `board/beacon-cm4/post-image.sh` | Bundle signing + image assembly |
| `board/beacon-cm4/post-build.sh` | Target rootfs customisation | | `board/beacon-cm4/post-build.sh` | Target rootfs customisation |
| `board/beacon-cm4/rootfs-overlay/etc/rauc/system.conf` | RAUC slot config | | `board/beacon-cm4/rootfs-overlay/etc/rauc/system.conf` | RAUC slot config |
| `openssl-ca/dev/` | Signing certificates (generated once) | | `openssl-ca/dev/` | RAUC signing certificates |
| `scripts/flash-cm4.sh` | Automated initial flash script | | `scripts/flash-cm4-sb.sh` | Initial flash (secure-boot CM4) |
| `package/beacon-otp/` | OTP key reader (`beacon-otp-key`) |